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Shamanism, Spiritual Transformation and the Ethical
Obligations of the Dying Person:
A Narrative Approach
Ellen W. Klein
ABSTRACT
The person experiencing chronic or protracted illness is
confronted with a complex array of physical, emotional and spiritual
trials. This thesis explores how chronic illness can be viewed through
the lens of the shamanic experience of dismemberment and rememberment and shows how clinical, narrative, and relational models
on their own are insufficient to speak meaningfully to illness
experiences, but the integration of aspects of each of these models
when coupled with shamanic initiation experience creates an
innovative model for patients and those with whom they are in
relationship.
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Introduction
Narratives aren‟t just the stories we tell our children at night.
They are the stories we tell ourselves, the stories that help us make
sense out of and find meaning in our experiences. They are also the
stories we tell others in cathartic efforts to externally order moments
of internal chaos and communicate who and what we are becoming as
a result of our experiences. Illness in particular has the ability to
disrupt the life story but as Arthur Frank in his work The Wounded
Storyteller suggests, “the ill person who turns illness into story
transforms fate into experience” (xi). But what kind of story can the
chronically ill person tell that will fully and meaningfully articulate the
experience of dying slowly through a series of seemingly endless
exacerbations and reprieves? What story can the chronically ill body
tell that has the power of spiritual transformation even in the face of
death?
One of the earliest known genres of stories in which illness
becomes a vehicle for spiritual transformation is that of the shaman
found originally in tribal societies among the peoples of Siberia and
Manchuria. At the roots of medicine, religion, and the hero‟s journey,
Shamanism has made a significant historical contribution across
1

cultures to the human experience. At some point in life each person
experiences a failure or crisis of some sort and, for this reason, the
initiation experience, according to Mircea Eliade in his work Rites and
Symbols of Initiation “lies at the core of any genuine human life”
(135).

The shaman‟s initiation experience represents a kind of

spiritual death and rebirth, acting as an ancient rite of passage
marking transition from one state of being to another, from the novice
to the initiated.

The passage from childhood to adulthood, for

example, is a natural transition recognized in many cultures even
today. The shaman‟s initiation is something more than developmental
transition, however. It is intense, tortuous, even violent and, I will
argue, remarkably similar to the experience of the person ravaged by
disease.
Mircea Eliade, in his classic work on shamanism, recounts a
shaman‟s spiritual transformation as part of a near death experience
brought on by smallpox. During his experience, he leaves his body,
enters the realm of spiritual beings, is instructed in the knowledge of
plants used in healing and then sees himself being torn apart, his
bones strewn everywhere and then collected and put back together
again. Life is breathed back into his body and then he is sent back as a
healer to his people and awakens in his hut, back in the earthly realm.
Through his illness and near death experience, the shaman is torn
2

apart, re-membered, and ultimately transfigured (Eliade, 1964, pp.3842). Indeed, he is given three new bones that enable him to heal and
communicate between the physical and spiritual realms. Having
attained spiritual insight and wisdom through his encounter with
death, the shaman is transformed into a healer and spiritual guide,
capable for example of leaving his body at will, foretelling the future,
healing the sick, and rescuing lost souls. The shaman‟s initiation
experience, I believe, is uniquely suited for the chronically ill as a story
through which their wounded bodies can speak. As Frank‟s work
suggests, the fate of illness becomes the experience of spiritual
transformation (xi). “The disease that sets the body apart from others
becomes, in the story, the common bond of suffering that joins bodies
in their shared vulnerability” (Frank, xi).
In this thesis, I will chronicle the ebb and flow of protracted
illness as a spiritual process of dismemberment and re-memberment,
examining the aspects of responsibility to intimate others. I will argue
that the experience of chronic or protracted illness must not be
reduced to little more than a clinical event because it is not only a
physical but also spiritual process represented best through narratives
and understood better as an opportunity for spiritual transformation as
described in the shaman‟s experience through which the sick may
discover meaning. My thesis is that in order to fully understand the
3

nature of the illness experience, we must explore the spiritual
dimension. I will argue that the spiritual component of the shaman‟s
initiation experience may provide clues for understanding illness as
spiritually transformative even in the absence of physical healing, and
that obligation to intimate others is critical to that transformative
experience.
I have come to understand my own experience of chronic illness
as a mirror of the shaman‟s spiritual experience of dismemberment
and re-memberment. Each relapse is a death. The succession of
relapses is felt like a series of tiny deaths, and in those moments of
crisis, the physical and emotional despair is so keen that death would
be a welcome release. Yet my feeling of obligation to others who care
about me and about whom I care will not let me give up. To abandon
my relationships and the obligations embedded in them would be to
relinquish a critical part of what it means to be human. The face of my
daughter appears before eyes squeezed shut in an effort to escape the
circumstance in which I find myself. In spite of everything, I am
wooed by her, by my commitment to her and my obligation to those
others that I love who hold a claim on me as well. My relationships call
out to me, their voices the only thing more audible than my despair.
Bound by the claim they have on me, spiritual re-memberment begins
with that pivotal moment in which what is required of me supersedes
4

my desire to give up. Like the shaman, I find my experience has the
power to transform rather than annihilate.
The following narrative account illustrates a moment of
exacerbation in my own experience of chronic illness. At the time, I
could not know for certain that I would recover or that, even if I did, I
would resemble my former self in any recognizable way.
It is inconceivable that I can have no feeling from the waist
down, no appreciable feeling that would allow me to use my
limbs, but I have pain, excruciating pain. Remember that I have
had a child, experienced the primal pain of labor. Labor has
nothing on this. This burns and sears and fires off rounds of
electricity from my back, around my torso and down into my
legs. It vibrates in concerto with the spasms in my muscles.

It

does not relent, does not even ebb like the contractions of labor,
and worst of all I cannot see hope of birthing something
beautiful from this. I am not one brought often to tears for
myself, but they stream in hot rivulets down my cheeks and
hopelessness begins to take up residence. I do not want to see
anyone. I do not want to be seen.
The contingent nature of my disease process leaves me dangling
precariously by the thread of “the law of thirds.” With each
exacerbation, I am confronted with a third of a chance that I will
5

recover all I have lost physically, some of what I have lost, or none.
And with each exacerbation something of my former self is changed
emotionally and spiritually. I am never the same person I was before
the relapse no matter what I may gain physically. I am not the
mother, wife, friend or colleague I was before. I am, whether I want
to be or not, changed by my experience. Illness makes an indelible
mark on my life.
The person experiencing chronic or protracted illness is
confronted with a complex array of physical, emotional and spiritual
trials. This thesis will explore how chronic illness can be viewed
through the lens of the shamanic experience of dismemberment and
re-memberment and show how clinical, narrative, and relational
models on their own are insufficient to speak meaningfully to illness
experiences, but the integration of aspects of each of these models
when coupled with shamanic experience creates an innovative model
for patients and those with whom they are in relationship.

6

Illness as Clinical Experience
Protracted illness presents a unique problem for patients,
caregivers, physicians and ethicists and, in particular, is
comprehended most often within a clinically, medically, and physically
oriented paradigm. This is evident in the current scholarly debate in
which illness is primarily viewed through a clinical lens that focuses on
the tension between paternalism and autonomy in medical decisionmaking. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the emphasis was
solely on paternalism but has shifted since then to an equally radical
focus on autonomy. The emphasis on absolute autonomy in medical
decision-making however has resulted in an over emphasis on patient
rights that communicates a problematic degree of personal freedom
and subsequently ignores the experience and expertise of clinicians.
Two voices are most prominent in this debate. Robert Veatch
and Edmund Pellegrino arguably represent the most noted and
respected scholarship in medical ethics. While Veatch more strongly
represents the sentiments of autonomy and Pellegrino aspects of
paternalism, both have shifted their approach to the fulcrum between
the two extremes and make the case for the benefits of representing
elements of each in the medical ethical aspect of the illness
7

experience. The danger of focusing on one to the exclusion of the
other is the potential for an imbalance in decision-making power.
Paternalism unchecked by patient autonomy has the power to override self–determination or personal narrative, rendering medical
decisions that may lack relevance for the patient. While incorporating
the experience and expertise of the practitioner, absolute paternalism
risks dictating clinical outcomes that lack language sufficient to
communicate hopefulness or reasoning that would inspire patient
compliance. This kind of paternalism risks excluding the patient from
the process and may therefore, do more harm than good.
The risks of absolute autonomy carry equal weight. Placing
decision-making entirely in the hands of patients disregards the
experience and expertise brought by practitioners to the process. In
the same way that paternalism exercised in its absolute form by
practitioners through clinical decision-making may unwittingly excuse
patients from the work and responsibilities that are a natural part of
being human, autonomy risks outcomes in which the patient may
excuse him or herself, thereby ceding to the disease process crucial
aspects of personhood. As a result, the illness rather than the person
with the illness takes center stage.
Although they once were at nearly opposite ends of the
spectrum, Robert Veatch and Edward Pellegrino have come to balance
8

the strengths and weaknesses of paternalism and autonomy by using
virtue ethics and the ethic of beneficence as complementary mediators
between the two extremes. What they bring to the problem is balance
to the potential harm of absolute forms of both models.
Speaking to the need for this balance, Robert Veatch offers an
alternative to the heavy handed medical paternalism born out of the
Hippocratic tradition in which the patient and the patient‟s friends and
family are deemed ignorant because they do “not have the knowledge
that comes [for physicians] with initiation into the cult [of medicine]‟
(Veatch, 59). “The Hippocratic Oath instructs the clinician, whether
using his own personal judgment or that of peers, to do what appears
to benefit the patient-even if the patient is not in agreement or does
not want the offered benefit” (Veatch, 58). Here Veatch aptly
articulates the root problem with forms of absolute paternalism in that
it makes no room for the concerns of the individual patient, denying
elements of personal agency. Subsequently, the patient treated under
paternalism is confined to a passive, receptive role and denied active
participation in his or her own care.
Veatch points out in his work The Basics of Bioethics that action
and intent are key concerns in the recent history of medical ethical
decision making. He weighs the differences in normative ethics
between emphasis on beneficence (producing good outcomes) and
9

nonmaleficence (avoiding bad outcomes) in value theory and the
emphasis on benevolence (willing to do the good) seen in virtue theory
(Veatch, 6). The physician acting paternalistically under the auspices
of good intent, while benevolent (willing the good) may not have
actually been beneficent (doing the good) (Veatch, 7). This is seen,
for example, in the physician who avoids truth telling in order to avert
potential harm to a patient by causing distress. Since the late 1980‟s,
a “return to the more traditional interest in the virtuous character of
the health provider” has emerged (Veatch, 7). Virtue ethics would
concern itself with the physician‟s character and his motive or intent in
choosing to avoid truth telling with a patient, whereas, value theory
would focus solely on the physician‟s actions, specifically, does the
physician‟s lie avoid a harmful outcome for the patient. More
specifically, the concern is that this paternalistic good intent would
produce actions that override the aspect of patient autonomy
understood as the respect for persons (Veatch, 7). Fortunately, a
more recent emphasis has been placed on accounting for both the
actions and character of the physician. This is indicative of the move in
medical ethics towards balance between the earlier extremes of each
ethical model and also between individual values of the patient and
physician.

10

Although “autonomous reason [has come to function as] the
cornerstone of secular bioethics,” Edmund Pellegrino does not support
patient autonomy as the primary concern of medical ethical decision
making (Pellegrino, 140). Even though an ethical perspective based
purely on autonomy is in direct opposition to the Roman Catholic
religious paradigm that dictates his understanding of the sanctity of
life, he could certainly not be accused of advocating for absolute
paternalism either. While Catholicism, he admits, “often is at the most
extreme pole from the current antimetaphysical biases of
contemporary bioethics,” he does not advocate for dismissing the
concerns of individual patients (Pellegrino, 141). He does this to the
extent that he believes the job of the clinician healer is to cure when
possible and to provide hope to patients in despair but not to the
extent that their “compassion…sanction[s] killing the suffering person
or helping him to kill himself” (Pellegrino, 121). For Pellegrino there
are clearly limits to the degree of autonomy patients should be
afforded. Rejecting purely autonomous actions such as euthanasia
and assisted suicide, Pellegrino calls for clinicians to become “expert[s]
in palliative care…help[ing] each patient to understand the roots of his
suffering and try compassionately to remove them” (Pellegrino, 124).
Like Veatch, he is as interested in the physician‟s character as his or
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her actions. Pellegrino summarizes his conception of virtue in ethics in
the following:
“Beneficence would be more than nonmaleficence, more than
avoiding harm or even doing good. It means doing good even
when it means sacrifice of self-interest. Autonomy would focus
on respect for persons and their dignity as creatures, not on
some absolute freedom or license to do with our lives what we
please. Respect for persons would, indeed, emphasize selfgoverning decision making. But our freedom as creatures of God
is always within the constraints of ethical and moral
determinants derived from Scripture, tradition, church teaching,
and the study of ethics (Pellegrino, 1988, 122-123).
Pellegrino does something here that Veatch does not. He offers a very
personal definition of what it means for the physician to be virtuous
and the kind of character from which one should expect a physician‟s
actions to be informed.
In The Virtuous Physician and the Ethics of Medicine Pellegrino
examines the impact of virtue ethics when applied to the role of the
physician. He notes a need for balance between action and character
or intent similar to what is found in Veatch‟s work.
The more we yearn for ethical sensitivity, the less we lean on
rights, duties, rules, and principles, and the more we lean on the
12

character traits of the moral agent. Paradoxically, without rules,
rights, and duties specifically spelled out, we cannot predict what
form a particular person‟s expression of virtue will take. In a
pluralistic society, we need laws, rules, and principles to assure
dependable minimum level of moral conduct. But that minimum
level is insufficient in the complex and often unpredictable
circumstances of decision-making, where technical and value
desiderata intersect so inextricably (Arras and Steinbock, 8283).
For Pellegrino, ethics based in virtue must accompany virtue based in
rights or law. Perhaps more importantly, Pellegrino and his colleague
David Thomasma in their book For the Patient’s Good: the Restoration
of Beneficence in Healthcare advocate for what they term
“beneficence-in-trust”. Here the concept of beneficence is reinterpreted to function in the patient /practitioner relationship in such
a way that patient autonomy compliments rather than competes with
the practitioner doing the clinical good. The relationship is defined by
an element of trust between the parties that each will act in the best
interests of the other. This, I believe, is what Pellegrino is talking
about when, as noted earlier, he says, “[beneficence] is doing good
even when it means sacrifice of self interest” (Pellegrino, 1988, 122).
Through dialogue, both practitioner and patient express their wishes
13

and/or concerns and come to understand one another‟s unique
contribution to the shared decision-making process. A terminal
patient, for example, may come to understand the benefit of an
undesired treatment as a means of decreasing pain or a physician may
come to accept a patient‟s desire to discontinue a treatment not in
keeping with their values. In this way, a patient‟s autonomy can be
expressed without leaving the patient abandoned in the process, or
allowing the practitioner to run roughshod over the patient in a radical
act of paternalism. Along with Veatch, Pellegrino and Thomasma
wisely advocate for a combination of compassionate and pragmatic
ethical approaches rather than one that takes precedence over or
claims no use for the other.
While issues concerning paternalism and autonomy, and value
and virtue ethics are only a small part of the complex processes of
medical ethical decision making, my intent here is not to detail the
many facets of the medical model but rather to point out its major
focus and highlight the fact that even at its most intricate, the model is
still not enough. The balance Robert Veatch and Edmund Pellegrino
bring to the historical tendency in bioethics towards extremes in the
ethics of paternalism and autonomy is crucial for both patients and
practitioners but the danger remains in focusing solely on any of these
clinical aspects in that alone they are insufficient to speak to the full
14

range of concerns for patients who are not ever simply a disease to be
managed or clinical outcome to be effected. Even Veatch notes
“[physical] health is an important goal, but not the only one” (51). As
such, the purely clinical story, however canonical, does not have the
ability to represent the full experience of illness.

15

Illness as Narrative Experience
“Human life is storied life” (Bochner, 73). In order to
understand and find meaning in our experiences, we live our lives in
the context of story, the stories we tell ourselves, and the stories we
tell others. Darrell Fasching, in his book Comparative Religious Ethics,
explains the rich history of storytelling as a means by which to
understand and express meaning found in the full range of human
experience.
Life, it has been said, is just a bowl full of stories. As far back as
we can see into the misty recesses of time and the human
adventure, human beings have been not only storytellers but
story dwellers. Their stories coursed through their veins and
sinews and came to expression in song and dance. To this very
day human beings see and understand the world through the
lenses of their stories (Fasching, 10).
Because we are not clinical beings, but individuals living inside a
story, illness experiences examined through narrative are understood
holistically and in greater detail. Illness is a kind of chaos that disrupts
our story as we have come to understand it and furthermore disrupts
our understanding of who we are in that story. Our lives are
16

interrupted as a consequence of the disruption of our sense of self,
and who we are or are becoming must be reinterpreted, rewritten. If
medicine is to treat the whole person, it must have the whole story.
For this reason, including the narrative aspect of the individual is
crucial to understanding the problem of illness. This aspect is what
the clinical model, despite its many practical and philosophical
attributes, lacks. Rita Charon, a physician, recognized the limits of the
clinical model and the value of incorporating and listening to the
stories of patients. By encouraging the inclusion of patient narrative in
assessment and treatment, “narrative medicine provides health care
professionals with practical wisdom in comprehending what patients
endure in illness and what they themselves undergo in the care of the
sick” (Charon, vii). Narrative medicine, she says, acts as a “corrective
to some of these failings, a support to these emerging strengths, and
response to these widespread yearnings…to unify and cohere divergent
aspects of sickness and healthcare” (Charon, ix).

Having so clearly

made the case for thinking narratively about illness as a complement
to thinking clinically and as a benefit to both patient and practitioner,
she has emerged as an authoritative voice in medicine and medical
ethics, especially for clinicians.
As part of listening and thinking narratively, Charon examines
the problem illness creates for the body and for the sense of self. The
17

body, she writes, “is proxy for the self…speaks [for] and can be
observed to constitute the self” (Charon, 86). As Charon points out,
“the body… coauthors the story of the life being lived in it” (87).
“Without the body, the self is an abstraction…cannot be
uttered…cannot enter [into] relation with others” (Charon, 87-88). So
when illness mars the body, it mars also the self inhabiting the body.
The following narrative vignette is drawn from a subsequent
exacerbation of illness in which my body was wrecked by dystonia and
seizures as a result of a lesion on the right hemisphere of my brain
and illustrates the discord Charon says illness brings to the sense of
self.
Staring in the mirror, I do not recognize myself. As if
looking in a funhouse mirror, I have become some distorted and
grotesque caricature of the person I used to be. I am not this
person… this is not me!...the voice of my fading former self
pleads inside my head….I don‟t know who this is staring back at
me, but I am angry and frightened by what I see, perhaps more
so by what I don‟t see, an image reflecting the me I know. My
face twitches rhythmically wrenching the left side into an ugly
smirk. The rest of my left side twitches along with it, my limbs
curling in on themselves, twisted and torqued into painful
positions from which I cannot extract myself. Ripples of
18

contractions roll over my abdomen and ribs and around to my
back, squeezing me and from my diaphragm producing an
animal-like grunt. Perhaps that is what I have become…an
animal. Surely there is nothing human about the state I am in
now. I wait for each wave to pass and wait more anxiously for
the next one to come in its painful wake, wondering if and when
it will ever stop.
Here the distortion of body is so great as to produce a distortion in my
sense of self. I cannot “see” myself in this body. I don‟t want to
because the divide is too great between who I know myself to be in
bodily form and who I see in the mirror. And so, the story I tell of my
self is halted, discombobulated. I am in need of a new story to make
sense of the chaos illness has wreaked not only on my body, but on
my self. To borrow Charon‟s language, my corporeal truth must find a
way to become narrative truth. I need my health care providers as
clinical partners to see and hear the narrative crisis created by my
illness, but I too must recognize and listen to the loss experienced by
the self and through the body. To do so is to make room for a new
story of body and self to emerge.
Charon‟s work skillfully and beautifully weds the practical, clinical
demands of practicing medicine with the unfolding stories of patients.
Together, all of the benefit of clinical intervention is actualized without
19

divorcing the patient from personhood. Most importantly, her work
advocates for approaching illness holistically and patients as persons
not just disease processes to be managed or medical decisions to be
made. But for the patient whose life story has become no longer
relevant in the context of illness, what kind of story can the body tell?
Arthur Frank brings to the narrative conversation the tales of the
“wounded storytellers.” He gives the sick a voice,” not just to work out
their own changing identities, but also to guide others who will follow
them” (Frank, 17). The wounded as tellers of story shift from passive
receivers of care to active givers of care broadening the “circle of
shared experience” (Frank, xii). “Because stories can heal, the
wounded healer and wounded storyteller are not separate, but are
different aspects of the same figure” (Frank, xii). Frank shifts narrative
contribution to clinical practice as seen in Charon‟s work to narrative
ethics as he envisions it: “an ethics of commitment to shaping oneself
as a human being” (158). “The personal issue of telling stories about
illness is to give voice to the body, so that the changed body can
become once again familiar in these stories” (Frank, 2). This is no
easy task. For while stories can tell about the body, more is required
to “make sense of illness stories… told [and heard] through the
diseased body” (Frank, 2-3). Illness stories are not however, only
personal. As Frank says, they are also social, for stories are told to
20

and in relationship with others (3). The very telling of a story, Frank
says, implies a listener (3). And so for Frank the questions remain,
what kinds of stories can sick bodies tell and what impact does the
social context have on their telling?
“Disease interrupts a life, and illness then means living with
perpetual interruption” (Frank, 56). Frank looks at the kinds of
narratives through which the sick as “wounded storytellers” manage
and story the interruption that is illness. He describes three kinds of
narratives in which “wounded bodies” are storied: restitution, chaos,
and quest. In restitution stories, the sick, least often the chronically
ill, seek and regain their health. Chaos narratives are in direct
opposition to the restitution narrative, in that they
“negate…expectation [and maintain a plot that] imagines life never
getting better” (Frank, 97). The quest narrative “meets suffering head
on, [with the belief] that something is to be gained through the
experience” (Frank, 115). Each of these stories offers a way to
navigate towards coherence and make reparation for the damage done
by illness to the body and the sense of self. Frank argues that
different people gravitate to different kinds of stories but whatever the
choice of narrative; people have a “responsibility for their stories and
for their bodies” (Frank, 52). Frank goes on to say that mere “survival
does not include any particular responsibility other than surviving”
21

(Frank, 137). Rather than survivors, the sick, he argues, may become
witnesses “responsible for telling what has happened and offering
testimony to a truth that is generally unrecognized or suppressed”
(Frank, 137). The truth he alludes to is, I believe, what is knowable
through illness as a transformative spiritual experience, by which I
mean the discovery of a story that makes sense of one‟s life even in
the face of death. The element of testimony, as Frank describes it, is
not unidirectional, but something that occurs in a “relationship of
communicative bodies” (Frank, 143). In witnessing, the sick person as
wounded storyteller takes responsibility for telling what may be
uncomfortable or painful, and the listener responsibility for hearing the
“truth” that may be equally so. Through rewriting themselves in story,
the sick are transformed into wounded storytellers and, in relationship,
testimony transforms the wounded storyteller into the wounded
healer.
Together, the narrative and relational aspects of Charon and
Frank‟s work act as tools for understanding illness in the context of the
life stories in which they occur. Both offer a crucial aspect to
understanding the illness experience through the narrative framework
their work provides. The insightful approaches to illness taken by
Arthur Frank and Rita Charon provide a basis for examining chronic
illness and physical brokenness through narrative, challenging as well
22

as augmenting the predominately clinical and theoretical approaches
to experiences of illness.

23

Illness as Relational Experience
As Charon and Frank point out, the illness experience is also a
relational experience. An essential component of what it means to be
human is expressed in our ability to be in relationship. In the same
way that the sick are not diseases separated from their person, we are
not persons completely isolated from others. And so, the experience
of chronic or protracted illness as much as it may make us strangers to
ourselves and to others, must be considered in the context of the
relationships in which we exist. As we compose the narratives of our
lives, we do so for ourselves and for our listeners in order to make
sense of the interruptions that are part of the natural course of life.
Illness often presents a more acute form of this problem and
exacerbates the need for a “meaningful story” to make sense of the
disruption it causes. Certainly, our listeners include the practitioners to
whom we tell our stories to seek physical healing or comfort, but our
listeners are also those with whom we are in intimate relationship.
Relationships with significant others require something of us. In
Frank‟s model, we are responsible to one another in the context of
telling and listening to stories, and for that matter, in the context of
24

memory, but what I would like to suggest here is that responsibility to
intimate others involves a degree of surrender of self to the other.
The purely autonomous self that may enjoy full expression of personal
agency does not exercise a full expression of his or her humanity.
Relationships have the power to shift our focus from self-centered
autonomous expressions of singular self pursuit (or what one wants)
to the self in relationship centered approach that considers the others
with whom we are in relationship. The chronically ill person may grasp
for any expression of self determination in response to the diminished
sense of self that results from illness, but this produces, I believe, a
limited and even false sense of what it means to be human.
To explore this further, it is helpful to look at what it means to
be in relationship with others. Two classic paradigms for
understanding relationship that have deeply influenced Western
civilization are found in Aristotle‟s model of friendship and the Judaic
model of covenant that has its historical origins in the biblical account
of the Israelites receiving the ten commandment at Mt. Sinai. It is
there that God compels the Israelites to enter into a relationship of
mutual obligation. God will guide and protect them and they in
response will keep the law set forth in the commandments given to
Moses. The covenant as it is expressed here is more than a mere
contract between two parties. It is a trilateral relationship with God as
25

the unseen third party transforming our relationships from the
mundane to the spiritual. As Jonathan Sacks describes, covenant is
more a relationship in which “we open our „I‟ to another‟s „Thou‟ [with]
God in between [as] that [which] joins self to self through an act of
covenantal kindness. That is hesed (kindness), the physical deed in
which soul touches soul and the universe acquires a personal face”
(54-55).
For Aristotle, friendship functions as the primary model of
relationship. In Books VIII and IX of Nichomachean Ethics, he
explores why we need friendships and how those friendships work.
While often accused of narcissistic tendencies, Aristotle‟s
understanding of friendship does imply something helpful for
understanding our responsibility to one another. For Aristotle, humans
are social creatures and friendship a virtuous endeavor, “most
indispensible for life” (Aristotle, 214). Friends, he says, “enhance our
ability to think and to act” (Aristotle, 215). This is because for
Aristotle, friends or intimate others act as another self, or another
myself in whom I can see my actual self more critically and therefore
more clearly (Aristotle, 266). As a mirror in which to better see and
understand ourselves, friends are crucial to the process of selfknowledge. We more easily see in others what is difficult to ascertain
in ourselves in isolation (Aristotle, 264). Personal autonomy is not a
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good or outcome with which Aristotle is concerned, for only in
friendship can we achieve the greatest degree of moral growth. As he
says, “friendship is an association or community…[and as friends we]
become better as [we] are active together and correct one another”
(Aristotle, 271-272). These aspects of Aristotelian friendship, in which
relationship with intimate others, to whom we are indelibly tied, are
crucial to our understanding of ourselves. Within these relationships
we find the place in which we are made better through our
associations and experience the best kind of personal growth.
While Aristotle‟s notion of friendship is helpful for examining the
relational aspect of illness, the addition of the concept of covenantal
relationship may better facilitate an understanding of the importance
responsibility plays in relationship, and even more so in relationships
with the sick. Indeed, Jonathan Sacks suggests this very notion when
he says that, “we discover God‟s image in ourself by discerning it in an
other” (54). As Victor Frankl declares, “being human means being
conscious and being responsible” (24). Embracing Frankl‟s notion,
Jonathan Sacks equates the exercise of responsibility to others with a
full expression of humanity and its absence with loss. He cites the
failures of Biblical characters such as “Adam who loses paradise [and]
Noah who declines into drunkenness” as narrative examples of the loss
experienced as a result of abdicating responsibility and the story of
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Babel as an example of what happens when we are responsible to no
one but ourselves (Sacks, 146). In an extreme act of hubris, the
biblical story tells us, the people of Babel “aspire[d] to reach heaven
by technological prowess rather than moral conduct” and in so doing
attempted to “take the place of God” (Sacks, 143-144). What the
people of Babel, and often we, fail to understand according to Sacks is
that “the word responsibility comes from the word response [and]
implies the existence of an other who has legitimate claims on my
conduct, for, or to, whom I am accountable” (Sacks, 144). This for
Sacks is the very underpinning of covenantal relationship.
Responsibility, says Sacks, “is intrinsically relational” (144). The story
of the sick person accountable to no one other than him or herself also
represents a failure of responsibility. “The ethical is never private; in
biblical terms, it is a matter of covenant between two parties, [in the
story of Babel between] God and humanity” and in the story of the
sick person, between the sick and their intimate others (Sacks, 144).
These two relational models work powerfully together as a
means for understanding illness as spiritual transformation and
providing the most helpful articulation of covenantal relationship
through which to explore the nature of intimate relationships and more
specifically the concept of responsibility between intimate others with
whom we are in relationship. For Sacks, “…human life without
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responsibility fails to do justice to human dignity…” (8). Applying his
covenantal model of relationship, the impact obligation and
responsibility to intimate others has on the experience of illness can
act as a catalyst to inspire willingness in the sick person to undergo
and even embrace the process of re-memberment despite the
uncertainty that is the earmark of chronic illness.
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Illness as Shamanic Experience
While the idea of illness as a spiritually transformative
experience is not novel, little focus has been given to illness as a
specifically shamanic experience. The significance of the shamanic
experience of dismemberment and re-memberment applied to chronic
illness is that it functions as a spiritual framework for the very real
experience of physical dismemberment and acts as a potential guide to
spiritual re-memberment even when the body may remain broken.
The shamanic initiation experience, as described by Mircea
Eliade, is a narrative for the “wounded storyteller” that unlike the
restitution narrative described by Frank, does not require restoration
of the patient to a previous and no longer available state. According
to Eliade, the shaman‟s initiation experience of spiritual transformation
is brought on by a crisis, often an illness or accident and is followed by
a near death type of "out of body" experience that includes an
experience of dismemberment. Broken in spiritual body, the shaman
experiences reintegration in a new self. His or her bones are collected,
fleshed with sinew and muscle and so he or she is “re-membered” and
transformed.

The following account by Eliade describes the stages of

initiation as follows:
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The important moments of a shamanic initiation are
these five; first, torture and violent dismemberment of
the body; second, scraping away of the flesh until the
body is reduced to a skeleton; third, substitution of
viscera and reveal of the blood; fourth, a period spent in
Hell, during which the future shaman is taught by the
souls of dead shamans and by 'demons'; fifth, an ascent
to Heaven to obtain consecration from the God of
Heaven (1994, 4).
The shaman‟s story is neither pleasant nor triumphant in the sense
that he does not rise unscathed by his experience. Instead, he is like
the biblical Jacob having wrestled with and been wounded by the
stranger, only to discover he was wrestling with God, who changes his
name to “Israel”, meaning he who wrestles with God and prevails
(Genesis 32: 24-32). Both figures carry with them and are defined
spiritually by their wounds. Theirs is not a story one takes up
willingly, but it is a narrative for the wounded body that does not
demand physical restoration but offers instead spiritual transformation.
Recalling an exacerbation caused by a lesion on my brainstem,
the shaman‟s account elicits from me a sense of kinship with him and I
hear in an account of my own dismemberment an echo of his own.
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At some point in the night, I have descended into the
underworld. I know because I have woken in Hell. When I open
my eyes the room spins violently counter-clockwise. Placing my
feet on the floor, I stand shaking my head in futile effort to clear
the double images. I list and capsize, falling to the floor retching
and unable to lift myself out of the pool of my own vomit.
For months this spinning continues. The lesion has
wreaked havoc on my equilibrium. My body does not know at
any time where it is in space and I cannot navigate myself. I
have lost all direction. I am unable to walk without falling, and
to slow an image on which I wish to focus I must tilt into the
spin, squinting to narrow the double image. Daily I try this with
my daughter‟s face hoping to settle on a single image of her to
make eye contact with her so that she will know that she is seen
by me. When finally the whirlwind of images begins to slow and
even after they have come to a halt, I find that I still do not
know which way I am going. I have lost my center.
This is my dismemberment; disease has broken me. My physical self
has been wounded but my loss of center is my loss of self, the self I
know, and with whom I had become comfortable, the one whose
stories I know and told with ease. My sense of loss is for this old
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familiar self. Who am I when she is gone? I am not the self I was,
admittedly, I did not even appreciate that girl until she was gone.
Illness for the shaman is an experience in which meaning and
purpose can be found. From his experience he gains spiritual insight
and the capacity to act as guide and healer to others. To borrow
Frank‟s language, he becomes the wounded healer. Similar to the
shaman‟s spiritual encounter, through illness, the sick are
dismembered physically, emotionally, and spiritually. And like the
shaman, the experience of dismemberment may be followed by rememberment from which they may emerge transformed. The shaman
in Eliade‟s account is transformed by his encounter with death, giving
him the capacity and knowledge to communicate between the realms
of life and death and the ability to heal others. Having already made
the journey into death, he is uniquely equipped to act as guide to
those who do not yet know their way. After similar encounter with
death, the sick person I believe has the capacity, like the shaman, to
be transformed by the experience and given new insight and the
ability to share the fruits of this transfiguration with others.
Returning to my own experience, I find that my encounter with
death was not only physical, but also spiritual. The sense of self that
was lost was my spiritual self and in order for me to be transformed
rather than annihilated by that loss, I had to allow my former self to
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die. Like the Buddhist Zen master Hakuin‟s parable teaches, I had to
release my hold over the abyss.
A man went astray and arrived at a spot which had never
been trodden by the foot of man. Before him there yawned a
bottomless chasm. His feet stood on the slippery moss of a rock
and no secure foothold appeared around him. He could step
neither forward nor backward. Only death awaited him. The
vine which he grasped with his left hand and the tendril which he
held with his right hand could offer him little help. His life hung
as by a single thread. Were he to release both hands at once,
his dry bones would come to naught. Thus it is with the Zen
disciple. By pursuing a single koan [spiritual puzzle which has
no “rational” answer upon which one meditates seeking spiritual
insight] he comes to a point where he is as if dead and his will as
if extinguished. This state is like a wide void over a deep chasm
and no hold remains for hand or foot. All thoughts vanish and in
his bosom burns hot anxiety. But then suddenly it occurs that
with the koan both body and mind break. This is the instant
when the hands are released over the abyss. In this sudden
upsurge it is as if one drinks water and knows for oneself heat
and cold. Great joy wells up. This is called rebirth (Heinrich,
258-259).
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My despair is authored by my inability to locate my self, to find
meaning in my experience and to find the story that will make sense of
my experience. As Darrell Fasching writes, “the paradox is that one
must will to plunge into that abyss, one must abandon oneself to
despair and will one‟s own death. The way to the great joy…is through
the great death…” (1988, 95). Giving in to that despair is the very act
that releases me from it.
The shamanic narrative shifts the emphasis from a physical
experience to a spiritual experience, from physical death to spiritual
death. Through the process of spiritual dismemberment and rememberment the shaman‟s story offers for the sick what the clinical
cannot, the possibility of spiritual transformation (i.e., the discovery of
meaning), even in the absence of physical renewal. Just as language
and story suggest that we are more than a physical body, chronic
illness is more than a physical experience.
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Conclusion
I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you... T.S. Eliot
As I have indicated, my thesis argument is that in order to fully
understand the nature of the illness experience, we must explore the
spiritual dimension, for it is here that out of brokenness and despair
we may experience rebirth. The spiritual component of the shaman‟s
initiation experience provides clues for understanding illness as
spiritually transformative even in the absence of physical healing, and
is strengthened when coupled with a sense of obligation to intimate
others.
The experience of chronic illness is the experience of darkness.
Illness is a form of St. John of the Cross‟ Dark Night of the Soul and
for those experiencing protracted illness, it is a series of many dark
nights. How to manage the darkness is to find meaning in the
experience of it, to find that which is meaningful enough to allow us to
trust the journey wherever it leads. Each of the previous models for
managing illness have provided some practical and even vital
component for understanding illness and finding meaning in the
experience.
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Clinical approaches to illness accomplish many things, in not only
the curative, but also the palliative sense. What they cannot do is
address the spiritual and emotional sides of illness. They do not have
an answer for the contingent nature of the disease process, for the
kind of suffering produced by uncertainty. Mark Hanson in Pain
Seeking Understanding points out that “to be human is to claim the
contingencies of life, including and especially suffering, and to find
meaning in the encounter with them” (181). He goes on to say that
”our very capacities to enter into a caring relationship with those who
suffer are central to our moral lives and human identity” (181). I
think what Hanson articulates here is one of the critical reasons for
rejecting any purely clinical model for addressing chronic illness.
Medicine gives us clinical answers, but not necessarily fully human
answers. For that we must look beyond the physical. We must seek
out meaning in illness that will allow us to embrace contingency and
suffering thereby exercising more fully our capacity as humans.
Therefore what I am suggesting is that the kind of answer we
need is not one only concerned with the physical aspect of illness, but
with how we become more fully human or retain our humanity in the
presence of chronic illness and all that it entails.
Narrative medicine gives us room to understand illness in the
context of individual life stories and a way for clinicians to embrace
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more than the physical suffering of their patients. Arthur Frank‟s work
offers not only patients, but patient‟s bodies a voice through narrative,
“injury becom[ing] the source of the potency of their stories” (xii).
With Frank, the sick can become wounded storytellers and
wounded healers, but it is with the Shaman‟s initiation experience that
we see a story the wounded can tell that articulates the way physical
suffering can give birth to spiritual awakening or rebirth. The shaman
is the bridge between the realm of the living and the realm of the dead
that for the shaman is where sacred ancestors reside. What the
shaman knows is that the living and the dead form one community
and therefore, to quote Mitch Albom, author of Tuesday’s with Morrie,
“death may end a life, but it does not end a relationship.” It is this
relationship that will compel the sick to embrace the shaman‟s
initiation and transformation through dismemberment and rememberment as their own. This is the aspect I believe is missing from
all of the other models and the aspect most crucial for compelling the
sick to persevere through the dark night of chronic illness, through the
myriad contingencies and unsettling state of uncertainty. The only
component sufficient to encourage this kind of commitment in the face
of death is through the claim intimate others have on each other
within the covenantal relationship in which we are responsible to
someone beyond ourselves.
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For this reason, when I close my eyes to shut out pain or fear,
the face and small voice of my daughter appear. This is what she calls
me to do. As John Dunne suggests in The Way of All the Earth,
consciousness projects an imagined path for our life, like a beacon
guiding us through the darkness, but what gives us a sense of
adventure is discovering the unexpected that lies ahead in the
darkness. It is the unexpected that overturns and transforms our
understanding of who we are and what our life means and causes us
to re-narrate our life story. For we are always strangers to ourselves,
who are more and other than we imagine ourselves to be.
Suffering, disappointment and death enrich us in unexpected
ways. So Dunne suggests we must “consent to both gifts, the light
and the darkness…to share the light is to share insight…to share the
darkness is to share the sense of [spiritual] adventure which goes with
the darkness and the journey into the night” (210, 216-217). This
journey is the journey we all must make, the one that leads inevitably
to death but when embraced rather than struggled against leads to
insight that is the spiritual transformation that transcends even death
(Dunne, 208).
The following narrative account shares a moment in the dying of
a young patient of mine many years ago. When I reflected on this
encounter, I was able to see how a narrative with which she was
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familiar (“going to grandma‟s house”) helped her find meaning in what
she was experiencing in her dying. Along with that, I found traces of
the shaman‟s experience in her final communications with her mother.
Before today, the last time I saw Emily was several weeks
ago at her school. She was tired. Cancer does that to a
body…dying does that. Still wanting to be with friends and
teachers and to maintain some semblance of normalcy, her
mother had reluctantly agreed to let her spend days or parts of
days she felt up to it at school with her kindergarten class. Her
teachers had placed a mat, the blue plastic folding kind, on the
floor in the napping room. When I came to see her that day that
is where I found her, laying on her side, her head haloed by
downy blonde fuzz and resting on a tiny pillow that somehow
managed to look large against her even smaller head. Her eyes
were closed and her respirations coming in slight shallow
breaths. I pulled another mat from nearby and lay down beside
her. Face to face, when she opened her eyes, we smiled at one
another and I knew her time would be soon.
Today she seems even smaller. I don‟t know how that can
be, but her tiny frame is swallowed in her mother‟s embrace. I
think to myself that perhaps it should be. I know when I see
them there in each other‟s arms nestled in a chair that she is
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nearly ready to die. This ordinary scene of maternal comfort is
shrouded in their shared lingering and longing and I wait.
Speaking for the first time since I have arrived, she asks her
mother, “Mommy, will you help me pack my bag?…I need to
pack my bag.” Fat tears spill from her mother‟s eyes and fall on
Emily‟s yellow flowered pajama‟s. Unsure what it means, her
mother looks over at me and I smile a little, silently nodding my
head urging her to follow along. She carries Emily into her room
to pack her pink suitcase with the words “going to grandma‟s” in
big bubble letters. Her mother puts her favorite books and
pajamas in and tucks the blanket Emily holds out on top.
Scooping her up she carries her back to the overstuffed chair,
dragging the case behind her. Settled once again, her mother
stroking the fine wisps of her hair she says, “Ok Mommy…I‟m
ready to go now.” Fresh tears welling in her eyes, “Go?..Go
where sweetheart?” her mother replies. “On my trip…keep this
for me, Mommy” she says taking her stuffed bunny from her
own chest and pressing it to her mothers. Closing her eyes, still
holding her bunny to her mother‟s heart, Emily took her final
breath.
Emily has stayed with me. I often think of her and her
encounter with death. She understood her dying as a journey, a trip
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she would make like the ones she had made to her grandmother‟s
house. So she packed her bag, taking the things she might need
along with her, but also leaving something behind. Packing her
suitcase was a symbol of preparing for her death. Leaving the bunny, I
think, was the symbol of the connection with her mother that would
remain unbroken by her death. Emily‟s story, like the one‟s told by
Lorraine Hedtke and John Winslade in Re-Membering Lives:
Conversations with the dying and the Bereaved, is not about
“producing closure or completing unfinished business [but rather]
about relationship going on and […] what might continue rather than
what might be lost” (5). The last conversation with her mother was
anything but final. Instead, it was an invitation to continue the
conversation even in death. As Hedtke and Winslade suggest,
“remembering conversations can start long before death [in order to]
construct a deliberate future that continues to include [a loved one]”
(5-6). Beginning those conversations in the way they describe makes
a place for the dying person‟s “voice to carry on, […] to incorporate
[their] voice […] and be responsible for carrying on its speaking” (7).
Furthermore, the ongoing connection acts as a comfort to those with
whom the dying are in relationship.
I too consider the possibility of constructing this conversation
with my daughter as a way to prepare us both for the next crisis, for
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even the final one. She lays claim on my life, as do the others whom I
love and who love me in return. She whispers it there in the dark of
death‟s night and I am compelled to respond. Through my obligation
to her, to those I love, I find meaning in what appears meaningless.
My story becomes one of rebirth where what is born is not something
separate from myself, but rather a new self, fledgling and tentative,
subject still to the contingencies of my disease, to uncertainty…fully
aware that to let go of my hold over the abyss is to embrace that
darkness, to give myself over to it. My efforts to exercise radical
autonomy in the shadow of death are pursuits for control over an
uncertain outcome, one beyond my control. They are limited to the
physical journey and not representative of the spiritual journey I am
making in which I do not seek to control the journey, to shut out the
darkness, but to trust it. Entering the shaman‟s story, my death does
not come as the end, the separation I fear. Through my relationships
the spiritual realms of life and death are bridged and my physical
death, whenever it comes, need not, like the darkness, be feared or
rejected, for death may end my life but not my relationships.
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